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The Impact of the Civil Jury on
American Tort Law
Michael D. Green*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. USING No-DUTY WHEN THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THERE Is No
NEGLIGENCE OR AN ABSENCE OF CAUSATION
III. USING NO-DUTY IN A SIMILAR FASHION TO PART II, WHEN THERE
ARE OTHER GOOD AND SUFFICIENT (BUT UNSPECIFIED) REASONS
FOR No LIABILITY
IV. EMPLOYING UNFORESEEABILITY TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS
NO DUTY BASED ON CASE-SPECIFIC FACTS OF THE SORT THAT
WOULD ORDINARILY BE FOR THE JURY OR OTHERWISE
EMPLOYING UNFORESEEABILITY IN AN INCOHERENT FASHION
V. DESCRIBING THE DUTY DETERMINATION IN FACT-SPECIFIC TERMS
BEFORE CONCLUDING No DUTY EXISTS OR THAT A MORE
STRINGENT DUTY THAN REASONABLE CARE APPLIES
VI. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
pruritus: the symptom of itching, an uncomfortable sensation
leading to the urge to scratch. Scratching may result in secondary
infection.'
I would like to begin by expressing my delight at having this
opportunity to participate in honoring Allen Linden. When Rick Cupp first
mentioned the idea for this Festschrift to me over two years ago, I thought it
was a fabulous idea. And it has only gotten better in the time since.
My initial introduction to Allen occurred some twenty years ago, but he
was not there and we did not meet. I was researching a book about
* Williams Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. I would like to thank
Peter Cane and participants at the Linden Symposium for helpful comments about this paper. This
paper is an extension of a talk I previously gave at the Institute for European Tort Law of the
Austrian Academy of Sciences.
1. MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY 937 (6th ed. 2005).
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Bendectin, a drug for pregnant women who suffered from morning sickness.
A number of suits had been filed by parents of children born with birth
defects, alleging Bendectin was a teratogen. Its manufacturer, the Wm. S.
Merrell Company, had also been the U.S. distributor for thalidomide, a
horrific drug that resulted in children born with phocomelia, the symptoms
of which are seal-like limbs or even no limbs. Some of us recall those tragic
pictures of European infants, some without any limbs, that made their way to
American shores in the 1960s.2
The United States fortuitously avoided the plague of thalidomide 3 -an
FDA staff person, Frances Kelsey, was concerned about another adverse
effect of the drug, and thalidomide was never approved for sale in the United
States.4 Kelsey was lionized for her role in saving U.S. children from this
plague.5 Even so, thalidomide was the occasion for another major
amendment to the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).6 In
addition to the requirement of demonstrating safety, the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments of 1962' required that drug manufacturers demonstrate the
efficacy of new drugs submitted to the FDA for approval. Ironically, this
strengthening of the FDCA, enabled by the furor over thalidomide, did
almost nothing to reduce the risk of a future thalidomide from slipping
through the FDA cracks.
But thalidomide was distributed in Canada, and there were almost 100
Canadian victims.9 Those Canadian victims faced substantial procedural
hurdles, much like the British victims, and a young Canadian academic at
Osgoode Hall Law School developed, as I wrote in 1996, an "ingenious
scheme" for these Canadian plaintiffs.o That plan called for crossing
Canada's southern border and employing plaintiffs' attorneys in the United
States, who could accept cases on a contingent fee." The United States'
legal system also protected victims from being subject to fee shifting if they
2. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS
Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 63-64 (1996).
3. There were thirteen United States cases. See id at 76-78.
4. See Cindy Pearson, Doctor Who Stopped Thalidomide Celebrates 80th Birthday, NAT'L
WOMEN'S HEALTH NETWORK NEWS, Sept. 1994, at 1.
5. See Bridget M. Kuehn, Frances Kelsey Honored for FDA Legacy: Award Notes Her Work on
Thalidomide, Clinical Trials, 304 JAMA 2109 (2010).
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
7. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 480 (1962) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of21 U.S.C.).
8. Testing new drugs on pregnant women is a difficult matter and the 1962 amendments did not
address that issue. Cf Sara F. Goldkind, Leyla Sahin & Beverly Gallauresi, Enrolling Pregnant
Women in Research-Lessons from the HINI Influenza Pandemic, 362 N. ENG. J. MED. 2241, 2241
(2010) (decrying that "clinical [drug] studies are rarely conducted in pregnant women").
9. THE INSIGHT TEAM OF THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON, SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE STORY
OF THALIDOMIDE 134 (1979).
10. GREEN, supra note 2, at 76.
11. Id.
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were unsuccessful, unlike the situation they faced at home. 12  The
thalidomide distributed in Canada had been manufactured in Ohio, lending a
plausible basis for proceeding in a suit against Merrell in Ohio.13
All of those cases were settled by Merrell, and Canadian victims
obtained the highest recoveries in the world.14 The author of this scheme
was Allen Linden, whom I would not meet in person for many years-too
many. But Allen's plan reveals one answer to the question we are
addressing today-United States tort law had much to offer those Canadian
children.
Allen later celebrated the role of tort law in calling the financially
powerful to task. He wrote about the Canadian victims' thalidomide
litigation:
Ordinary citizens have rendered accountable many manufacturers of
shoddy goods .... Many of the executive officers of [Merrell] had
to spend many hours examining their practices, engaging in
discussions with lawyers, and justifying their stewardship to their
shareholders. It was tort law, not the administrative or the criminal
process, that challenged the conduct of the drug company.'"
Perhaps more accurately, the United States tort system, much of it
procedural, was of great benefit to those plaintiffs who, without it, would
have suffered a fate more like the British victims. Their claims were
delayed for many years because of joint legal aid representation of a group
that had conflicts among them.16
Having begun with my introduction to Allen, I would like to take a
moment to salute him for his creative and inquiring legal mind, remarkable
personal warmth, passion for justice, concern for the less powerful, and sage
advice over the past decade; and to thank him for his loyal friendship. I
would also like to thank him (and Rick Cupp) for developing the topic for
today, which provides us an embarrassment of rich choices of avenues to
12. Id
13. Id.
14. INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 9, at 136; see also Elaine Carey, Thalidomide 'Babies' at 25:
Struggling to Live on a Pittance, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 27, 1987, at Al (Canadian victims recovered
an average of $200,000 (Canadian) each).
15. Allen M. Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. B. REv. 155, 159 (1973).
16. Foreign Bendectin claimants were not able to pursue the same course as their thalidomide
ancestors. Piper v. Reyno, decided by the Supreme Court in 1981, placed an almost impenetrable
forum non conveniens barrier to foreign plaintiffs suing American defendants in federal courts in the
United States for injuries suffered outside the United States. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981); see also In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ohio 1982). But see
Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
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explore in both domestic and foreign tort law and to be frankly normative in
our assessment of whatever aspect of U.S. tort law we might be interested in.
Actually, it affords at least twice as many opportunities because we could
address the U. S. tort system, which so many in other countries look on with
horror, or tort law. In honor of Allen, I would like to talk about tort doctrine
and the extent to which U.S. tort law has anything to offer the rest of the
world.
One can find repeated claims that American tort law is not that different
from tort law around the globe.17 Convergence of private law in this age of
globalization is a popular refrain. I have a different perspective I would like
to put forth: the jury, surely the most controversial procedural device in
American law, 8 has deeply influenced our tort law. That influence results
in law that is of no interest to the rest of the world, which has done away
with civil juries, save for rare or limited instances. 9
17. See Ulrich Magnus, Why is US Tort Law so Different?, I J. EUR. TORT L. 102, 109 (2010)
("Apart from [punitive and compensatory damage] differences, it becomes difficult to identify
further [remarkable rules] of US tort law that deviate drastically from their European counterparts.");
Eric Engle, Aristotelian Theory and Causation: The Globalization of Tort, 2 GUJARAT NAT'L L.
UNIV. L. REV. 1 (2009) (asserting that there exists a "remarkably uniform globalized system of tort
law"); cf Jane Stapleton, Benefits of Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in Translation, 1 J. TORT L.
6, 41 (2007) ("Nonetheless, there has been quite an embarrassing amount of work published that
asserts, not merely that there is much harmony already between the tort law of European systems,
but also that they are rapidly converging.") [hereinafter Stapleton, Lost in Translation]. But see
Stapleton, Lost in Translation, supra, at 21 (explaining numerous aspects of tort law influenced by
nationalist cultures that are not common and remarking on the "profound influence" of the jury and
"covert manoeuvres" employed to constrain the jury's authority). In addition, we should not forget
the difference in approach between Civil Law and Common Law systems. See Gerhard Wagner,
Comparative Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1003 (Mathias Reimann
& Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
18. Professor Rosenberg has described the paradox that the jury's virtues of injecting community
values and knocking the harsh edges off the law often form the basis of the criticism that the jury
engages in unbridled and unprincipled lawmaking. Maurice Rosenberg, Contemporary Litigation in
the United States, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY: ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES
COMPARED 176-77 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1977). Compare PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1956);
CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY (1962); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 248-54 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lemer eds., 1966); and Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of
the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964), with JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 108-45 (2d ed. 1950); Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury:
Fact or Fiction?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386 (1954); Milton D. Green, Juries and Justice-The Jury's
Role in Personal Injury Cases, 1962 U. ILL. L. FORUM 152; and Leon Sarpy, Civil Juries, Their
Decline and Eventual Fall, II LOY. L. REV. 243 (1962). The debate over juries has raged for
centuries. See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA xiii (1988) ("[F]or each advocate of the jury
throughout its long history in America, there seems to have been a matching opponent."). Compare
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-48 (1830) (detailing importance of right to jury trial),
with Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV.
639 (1973) (detailing federalists' opposition to jury trials). Even Mark Twain expressed his views
on the jury: "The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon
ignorance, stupidity and perjury. It is a shame that we must continue to use a worthless system
because it was good a thousand years ago." MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 247 (1872) (emphasis in
original).
19. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN
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Although I want to emphasize the doctrine of duty and its role in
American tort law, there are numerous, prominent aspects of the
contemporary torts scene that are influenced by, or simply the result of, the
existence of the civil jury. I suspect I have missed some, but consider:
(1) Strict Products Liability. It is no secret that the United States
beat a retreat from section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and strict products liability.20  Replacing consumer
expectations with a negligence standard, as the Third Restatement
did for warnings and design defects, was due to the open-endedness
of consumer expectations in the hands of juries. An important assist
in this development goes to the aggressiveness of the plaintiffs' bar
in taking advantage of this new strict products liability by pushing
the design defect envelope.
By contrast, strict liability and consumer expectations were adopted
in the European Union as we were turning our backs on them and
have survived longer there than they did here. But EU-style strict
liability is administered by judges rather than juries. It may be that
an environment of judicially applied standards works reasonably
well for a strict-liability, consumer expectations-based standard for
product liability, and does not result in every design defect claim
being a tossup for largely unconstrained jury determination.2' Thus,
AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1014 (1994) (stating that in common law countries other than the United
States, "the civil jury has been abolished"); NEIL VIDMAR, A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE ON THE COMMON LAW JURY, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1, 3 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000)
("[W]ith the exception of the United States and parts of Canada, the jury has been largely abandoned
for civil cases . . . ."). Richard Posner reveals his preference in his brief observation on the United
States' jury iconoclasm, commenting that the abolition of the civil jury is "a course that the rest of
the civilized world took long ago." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 193-94 n.l (1996). Peter Cane explains the decline of the civil jury in Australia. Peter
Cane, Searching for United States Tort Law in the Antipodes, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 257,276-79 (2011).
20. 1 would attribute the beginning of that retreat to the New Jersey Supreme Court's reversal of
fortune on whether foreseeability of the risk is required before an obligation to warn is required. In
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), the court rejected a role for
foreseeability of risk with regard to determining whether a product was defective for strict liability
purposes. Eighteen months later, in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984), the
New Jersey Supreme Court limited Beshada "to the [unspecified] circumstances giving rise to its
holding," Id. at 388, and provided manufacturers a state-of-the-art defense. Imposing liability in the
absence of foreseeability of risk-a genuine test for whether this "strict liability" is free of fault
notions thereafter never really gained traction in products liability law. See, e.g., Vassalo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
21. I have explained the vision of those who were in the vanguard of the strict products liability
development and their conception that the consumer expectations test would be applied to significant
failures of products to perform in their ordinary fashion, rather than to the question of how much
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I question Victor Schwartz's suggestion that the European Union
repeated the error of § 402(A) in its Directive.22
(2) Preemption. Although preemption is nominally about
Congressional intent, there are significant strains of skepticism
about jury decision making and the superiority of expert agencies in
the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence, especially in the
medical device case, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.23 One may question
whether there would be a difference of view if judges replaced
juries as fact finders with regard to adopting absolute deference to
regulation, as preemption does. My suspicion is that with judges
deciding whether to invoke preemption, they would be more
sanguine about the ability of judges to make judgments about the
appropriate account to take of relevant regulation as an aspect of the
common law process without the rigidity of preemption.24
(3) Daubert. Of course it comes as no surprise to say that
evidentiary rules are influenced by the existence of juries. Much of
what domestic courts are doing today with Daubert in tort cases
might have been done with another procedural device, namely
sufficiency of the evidence. Either way, this is a development that
is a consequence of the jury meeting the rise of toxic substances
litigation in the 1970s, after the Federal Rules of Evidence
liberalized the admissibility of expert testimony, and skepticism
about juries' ability to sort out the testimony of experts about
26
causation.
marginally safer a product should be designed. See Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated
Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807
(2009). Professors Aaron Twerksi and James Henderson, the co-Reporters for the Products Liability
Restatement, have been among the most vociferous critics of consumer expectations as an
independent standard for design defects. In significant part they rely on its indeterminacy in difficult
cases, leaving the jury to its own, largely unfettered, discretion. See James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867,
880 (1998).
22. Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Exporting United States Tort Law: The
Importance ofAuthenticity, Necessity, and Learning from Our Mistakes, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 551, 554,
554-58 (2011).
23. 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008).
24. Might Congress, in enacting legislation, be more sanguine about that prospect as well?
25. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
26. Commentators are unanimous in attributing Daubert to jury skepticism. See Edward K.
Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1292 (2007)
("Daubert's concept ofjudge as gatekeeper is fundamentally infused with skepticism toward the jury
.... "); Gary Edmond, Supersizing Daubert Science for Litigation and its Implications for Legal
Practice and Scientific Research, 52 VILL. L. REv. 857, 908 (2007). Actually, the implementation of
Daubert should be attributed to jury skepticism. Justice Blackmun in Daubert made it a point to
disagree with the extreme views expressed by respondents and their supporters about jury capacity.
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(4) The Constitutionalization of Communicative Torts. One cannot
help but read New York Times Co. v. Sullivan27 as a brief
concerning provincial southern attitudes that required containment.
To be sure, a robust right of free speech was also a necessary
condition for this development; my claim is that without the jury it
also would not have been necessary.28
(5) Comparative Fault. The United States was quite late in adopting
comparative fault. 29 In one respect, I believe the jury, with its
capacity to knock the rough edges off of the unfaimess of
contributory negligence by returning compromise verdicts,
dampened the unfairness of that rule and contributed to its delayed
adoption here.30  The jury's ignoring the rule of contributory
negligence may, at the same time, have contributed to the hastening
of comparative fault. This conflict then reveals the schizophrenia in
our attitudes about the jury, thus reflecting, on the one hand, the
jury's use of common sense notions of justice to provide grass roots
normalization of law while simultaneously, on the other,
demonstrating jury lawlessness.
(6) Retention of status-based rules for landowners. These rules,
born in Britain, were disavowed there beginning in 1957." That
reform began later in the United States and did not reach majority
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1993) (characterizing as "overly
pessimistic" the view that, without constraints, the result will be a "'free-for-all' in which befuddled
juries are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions"). What Daubert did was
to give the opportunity to federal judges who were jury-skeptics to intervene on expert testimony.
27. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28. I recognize that Great Britain is contemplating reforms to scale back its vigorous defamation
laws and that the Canadian Supreme Court recently adopted a "responsible journalism" defense. See
Sarah Lyall, Britain, Long a Libel Mecca, Reviews Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009, at Al; Grant v.
Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 (Can.). One must recall, however, that Britain largely retains the jury
for defamation cases. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 69(1) (Eng.). Canada continues with some
jury trials-the Grant case was tried by a jury, which awarded compensatory and punitive damages
to the plaintiff. See Grant, 2009 SCC para. 5.
29. See Stapleton, Lost in Translation, supra note 17, at 26 ("[A non-U.S. tort lawyer] may be
shocked to discover that contributory negligence was a complete defense to U.S. tort claims until
relatively recently.").
30. This account conflicts with that of Robert Keeton, who credits juries' refusal to adhere to the
rigidity of contributory negligence as hastening the comparative fault reform. See ROBERT E.
KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 74-75 (1969); FRANK,supra note 18, at 110-11.
31. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (Eng.), available at http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1957/31/pdfs/ukpga 19570031 en.pdf(as enacted).
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status until sometime in the twenty-first century,32 half a decade
after Britain. Their survival here might be attributed to the
disciplinary tools they provided to courts in supervising juries
deciding premises liability cases.33
(7) My conviction that tort reform-specifically caps on damages-
is a consequence of jury determination of damages, particularly
non-pecuniary damages, is tempered only slightly by the fact that
the Supreme Court of Canada did the same thing in 1978 in a case
tried by the court.34 Yet throughout Europe, formal and informal
mechanisms by which judges keep the variability of damage awards
in check make damage caps unnecessary. 35 At least some decisions
finding those caps to be unconstitutional rely on constitutional
protection of the right to a jury trial.
(8) Primary Assumption of Risk. As a prelude to going into a bit
more detail about another topic, duty, I would add that primary
assumption of risk, a sibling of no duty, is another mechanism by
which American tort law withdraws from juries a specified
activity-recreational sports or operating sports stadia-the
authority to impose liability for conduct that the jury might find
unreasonable."
(9) Settlement effects. The greater variability in damage awards by
juries, particularly in personal injury cases for non-pecuniary losses,
provides incentives for those who are risk averse, which describes
most personal injury claimants and many defendants, to settle. The
extremely high settlement rate in the United States,38 which is
32. The Third Restatement reports that, as of 2009, of forty-eight jurisdictions that are
classifiable, twenty-four had "adopted a unitary standard of reasonable care to at least licensees and
invitees." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 51 reporter's note cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6,
2009). Later that year, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the status-based rules for licensees,
adopting a duty of reasonable care. See Koenig v. Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 2009).
33. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 237, at 615 (2000) (theorizing that the status-
based rules, as applied by courts, resemble in substance a rule of reasonable care but provide courts
greater control of juries); Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the
American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 407, 440 (1999) (explaining the advantage of
"spurious rules," such as landowner duties).
34. See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alta. Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 (Can.).
35. See Cane, supra note 19, at 277 (explaining "semi-authoritative 'tariff of injury awards
designed to achieve predictability and uniformity" in the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, in
Australia).
36. See Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010).
37. See, e.g., Davidoff v. Metro. Baseball Club, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 1219 (N.Y. 1984); Knight v.
Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
38. Professors Clermont and Eisenberg have documented that roughly two-thirds of all civil
cases filed are settled by the parties. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation
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surely due as well to a number of other factors, is supported by the
uncertainty created through ad hoc jury awards of non-pecuniary
damages.
(10) The popularity of arbitration. Arbitration is limited to parties
who have a contractual relationship, which is often not the case for
personal injury torts, with the exception of products liability.
Nevertheless, the rise of arbitration, including in commercial
litigation in which economic harm torts may be asserted and in
consumer protection disputes, is influenced by the alternative of a
jury arbiter if one resorts to the courts for dispute resolution.
Let me begin my discussion of the role that the jury plays in forming
(and deforming) duty doctrine by returning to the shaping of the American
tort system. A trilogy of tort cases appeared to open a role for a robust
negligence system-one that would be administered by the jury with courts
having a modest role. The first two of these cases involve the classic
Goodman-Pokora pairing. Holmes had the opportunity in Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad v. Goodman40 to employ the ideas he had written about in The
Common Law, published in 1881.
In his commentary about tort law in The Common Law, Holmes made
four observations that are relevant to the respective roles of judge and jury:
(1) Standards of conduct are for judges to set forth, while historical
facts are for the jury;
(2) However, negligence or breach of duty is submitted to the jury,
even when the doubt is about the appropriate standard of care rather
than the facts;
Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 119, 135 (2002).
39. Chris Drahozal, who specializes in international commercial arbitrations, reports that there is
no good data on the comparative incidence of arbitration in the United States and other countries. E-
mail from Chris Drahozel, Professor of Law and Assoc. Dean for Faculty Dev., Univ. of Kan., to
Michael D. Green, Williams Professor of Law, Wake Forest Univ. (July 21, 2010) (on file with
author). There are, however, legal impediments to the enforcement of arbitration provisions in
consumer and employment contracts in other countries that contrast with the aggressive enforcement
of arbitration clauses in the United States. Steven Ware attributes that difference to the civil jury in
the United States. See Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in
Comparative Perspective: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 865 (2002).
40. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
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(3) Nevertheless, submission to the jury is not required and when a
"state of facts often repeated in practice" exists-judges should set
forth the appropriate standard of care, leaving to juries only the
question of historical fact;
(4) Setting forth those specific standards of care would further an
important function of law: "narrow[ing] the field of uncertainty." 41
Goodman involved a railroad crossing accident in which the plaintiff
was injured while driving over railroad tracks, when defendant's train hit
him.42 Defendant asserted that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in
crossing the tracks.43 Although this appeared to be a case in which maxim
two was operative and the jury would decide the matter, Holmes invoked
principle three: "When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he
goes to a place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him," and he
must take precautions, including stopping and getting out of his vehicle if
unable to determine whether a train is bearing down on him." Not only did
the adoption of a specific standard narrow uncertainty by providing a rule of
law rather than a jury verdict having no precedential value, specific legal
standards address the respective role of judge and jury, displacing the jury
and leaving for the court a determination that, as it was in Goodman,
dispositive on the question of liability. The narrow rule that required
stopping and departing from the vehicle limited the relevant facts to the
point that there was no dispute of historical fact and no issue about whether
the legal standard was satisfied. Depending on how often judges found
repeated patterns and invoked Holmes's dictum to provide a specific rule of
law, Goodman could have produced a system in which juries played a
considerably subdued role.
Seven years later, Benjamin Cardozo had replaced Holmes on the
Supreme Court (two other justices had also been replaced) and, in another
railroad crossing case, Pokora v Wabash Railway Co.,45 the Court
effectively overruled Goodman, declaring that exiting the car and
reconnoitering was not required of a driver crossing railroad tracks in all
cases.46 Not only was the Goodman rule out of touch with ordinary
behavior (as any jury would appreciate, Cardozo might have added), but
different circumstances prevailing at a railroad crossing may require
41. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 161-63 (1993) (citing OLIVER
WENDEL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123-28 (1881)).
42. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 69.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
46. Id. at 101.
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different precautions.47 Thus, Cardozo imbued in determinations of
negligence 4 8  what the Restatement characterizes as "an ethics of
particularism,... which requires that actual moral judgments be based on
the circumstances of each individual situation." 49
The third case in this trilogy is another Cardozo opinion, earlier than
Goodman and Pokora, from his time on the New York Court of Appeals.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.so cast aside the privity barrier that had
insulated defendants for so long from a jury scrutinizing their behavior.
MacPherson thus exposed to tort liability those whose negligence occurred
in the performance of a contract that resulted in harm to a person not a party
to that contract.
These cases, in sum, seemed to lend succor to Holmes's claim that tort
law involves a duty owed "of all the world to all the world."5 2
With a general "reasonable care" standard owed to the entire world, the
jury would be empowered to decide cases, unencumbered by the normative
views of the judge as to the appropriate standard of conduct.53 It is common
wisdom that the Cardozo view of jury hegemony won out and that the
American tort system reflects that view.54 Thus, Richard Posner observed
recently that while contract law has a number of constraints to limit jury
authority: "Tort law does not have these screens against the vagaries of the
jury."5  With the law providing a general duty of care owed to all-that
47. See id. at 105-06.
48. There is an irony in Cardozo playing the role of putting the jury in the ascendancy in
deciding tort cases. Cardozo could be quite cavalier about rejecting jury verdicts with which he
disagreed. See, e.g., Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 177 N.E.2d 416 (N.Y. 1931); Adams v.
Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919). Nevertheless, Andrew Kaufman, Cardozo's biographer, reports:
"Although Cardozo was assiduous in protecting the role of the jury, he did not hesitate to take an
issue away from the jury when his reading of a record convinced him that the factual issue should be
decided only one way." ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOzO 255-56 (1998).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 8, cmt. c
(2010).
50. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
51. Seeidat1053.
52. The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 660 (1873) (author not named but widely believed to
be Oliver Wendell Holmes (2 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 81-82
(1963)). A contemporaneous British case, Heaven v. Pender, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 503 at 509 (Eng.),
expressed a similar idea.
53. See Stapleton, Lost in Translation, supra note 17, at 21.
54. See Fleming James, Jr., Functions ofJudge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667,
676 (1949) ("On the whole the rules of accident law are so formulated as to give the jury
considerable scope in deciding what the parties should have done, in each specific case, as well as
what they did do. The cardinal concept is that of the reasonably prudent man under the
circumstances. . . .").
55. All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir. 1999). Posner's
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duty consisting of the flexible balancing approach of reasonable care, the
determination of whether a breach occurred left to the unconstrained
judgment of a sample from the community-one might have expected that
tort law would move forward with, as Jane Stapleton puts it, an era of a
"dominant and voracious tort." 6
It is my thesis, by contrast, that the history of tort law since the trilogy
has been the development of various devices to control the jury, often
covertly, and to shift to judges greater authority over the outcome of tort
cases." Of course, in countries without the civil jury, these devices are
largely unnecessary. This phenomenon leads me to suggest that there are
pockets of our tort law that have no utility for other countries-countries
that do not have to contend with the judge-jury tension so prevalent in
domestic tort law. And so, I invoke the epigram with which I began this
article: duty doctrine in the United States is more likely to cause an epidemic
of pruritus than to be of use to the rest of the world.
In the United States, sometimes duty is employed for explicit reasons to
limit liability, as for example the concern with "crushing liability,"
expressed in the well-known case of Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.1 8  Recall
that Strauss involved a blackout in New York City when Consolidated
Edison failed properly to manage its power grid." The court declared that
Consolidated Edison owed the plaintiff, with whom it was not in privity, "no
duty" because the liability to which the utility would otherwise be exposed
would be too great.60 Rules of law such as adopted by the Strauss court are
required, whether based on duty or not, and regulate matters such as which
kinds of harms under what circumstance are cognizable. Those kinds of
rules are necessary in any jurisdiction with tort law, rather than leaving the
outcome to unbridled fact finder discretion.
But there are linguistic and conceptual difficulties in using "duty" as the
means to carve out an area of no liability. Ordinary usage of "duty" means
"something that one is expected or required to do by moral or legal
proclamation about tort law is all the more surprising in light of his comment, four years earlier,
about the revival of duty limitations after a universal duty of reasonable care had been recognized:
"[T]he concept of duty was revived to name some of these limitations [on the scope of liability for
negligence] and to exert some control over juries." Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484, 488
(7th Cir. 1995).
56. See Stapleton, Lost in Translation, supra note 17, at 14.
57. I take comfort in the fact that our honoree has made a similar claim: "The duty concept is a
control device that enables courts to check the propensity of juries to award damages in situations
where matters of legal policy would dictate otherwise." ALLEN M. LINDEN & BRUCE FELDTHUSEN,
CANADIAN TORT LAw 285 (8th ed. 2006).
58. 482 N.E.2d 34, 39 (N.Y. 1985). Jane Stapleton identifies other no-duty rules in American
law that she attributes to jury control. See Jane Stapleton, Controlling the Future of the Common
Law by Restatement, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 262, 290-92 (M. Stuart Madden ed. 2005)
[hereinafter Stapleton, Controlling the Future of the Common Law by Restatement].
59. See Strauss, 482 N.E.2d at 39.
60. See id. at 35.
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obligation."' Thus, duty is concerned with obligations about how one
acts-primary behavior. But in deciding that Consolidated Edison had no
duty to Mr. Strauss, the New York Court of Appeals surely did not mean
that Consolidated Edison had no obligation with regard to how it managed
its power grid. Indeed, Consolidated Edison had already been found grossly
negligent and liable to another injured customer, albeit one who was injured
in a location where he was a customer of Consolidated Edison.62
The logical conclusion of this is that Consolidated Edison
simultaneously owed and did not owe a duty of care in managing its power
grid, depending on where Mr. Strauss was when he was injured.6 ' This
brings me to the first instance of duty-rhetoric induced pruritus. Head
scratching is but one means of dealing with the dissonance created by such
decisions.
But the use of duty in the United States has the potential to cause a
worldwide epidemic of pruritus and goes well beyond the now-you-have-it,
now-you-don't aspect of Strauss. There are several other uses of duty to
control the jury on the modem domestic torts landscape-yet all are
employed opaquely without acknowledging the purpose for their invocation.
II. USING NO-DUTY WHEN THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO
NEGLIGENCE OR AN ABSENCE OF CAUSATION
This may be the most common misuse of duty," in which the court
believes there is no negligence but relies on no-duty instead as the basis for
61. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 609 (1996).
62. See Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 429 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 1981). This is the
manner in which duty is employed in tort law today. See Donaca v. Curry Cnty., 734 P.2d 1339,
1340 (Or. 1987) ("'[N]o duty' is only a defendant's way of denying legal liability for conduct that
might be found in fact to have unreasonably caused a foreseeable risk of harm to an interest of the
kind for which the plaintiff claims damages.").
63. The same situation of simultaneous duty/no-duty to the same person arises from the use of
duty to police the boundaries of recovery for stand-alone emotional harm. Thus, a defendant may
act without reasonable care and put at risk a plaintiff. If the plaintiff suffers personal injury, the
defendant had a duty to the plaintiff and will be liable. But if the plaintiff only suffers emotional
harm, the defendant had no duty and will not be liable.
64. As John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky have said, collapsing breach and duty "is probably the
greatest single source of confusion over duty" and its use "surreptitiously ... shrink[s]" the jury's
role in deciding breach. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and
the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 713 (2001); see also Stapleton,
Controlling the Future of the Common Law by Restatement, supra note 58, at 294 (remarking on the
"typically covert maneuvers that are made to prevent issues reaching the jury"). For judicial
recognition and criticism of collapsing duty and breach, see for example, Marshall v. Burger King
Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048 (I. 2006); Coburn v. City of Tucson, 691 P.2d 1078 (Ariz. 1984).
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ruling as a matter of law that the defendant is not liable.s Consider Lawlor
v. Orlando,66 in which the estate of a former patient who committed suicide
sued the deceased psychotherapist. The patient had made no suicide
attempts, made no threats about committing suicide, made no mention of
suicide, and revealed no suicidal tendencies. A screening performed a few
months before the patient committed suicide found no threat of suicide.68
One might wonder what possible basis existed for concluding that the
defendant-psychotherapist acted unreasonably. Of course, that
determination was one for the fact finder, and the court concluded that the
defendant owed no duty to a patient treated as an outpatient. Yet, suppose
that a patient, treated on an outpatient basis, exhibits signs of being suicidal
and that these signals accelerate over a period of time during which the
patient's psychotherapist sees the patient regularly. To make the case even
more compelling, let us add that the patient's spouse contacts the
psychotherapist and explains additional behavior that points toward the
patient being suicidal, expresses concern about the patient's intentions, and
adds that the patient resisted any assistance from the spouse. I doubt that the
resolution of that case would be on the basis of no duty, despite the general
reluctance of courts to permit tort claims that arise from a competent
individual's decision to commit suicide.70
III. USING NO-DUTY IN A SIMILAR FASHION TO PART II, WHEN THERE ARE
OTHER GOOD AND SUFFICIENT (BUT UNSPECIFIED) REASONS FOR No
LIABILITY
One example of this no-duty usage is based on John Goldberg and Ben
Zipusky's discussion of Parmely v. Hildebrand" as an example of a case in
which they claim courts have to struggle with duty even in the core situation
of physical harm.72 Defendant in Parmely built a house for himself and his
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt.
i (2010).
66. 795 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the defendant-psychotherapist
owed no duty with regard to former patient's suicide where patient evidenced no suicidal tendencies;
had made no threats of committing suicide; made no suicide attempts; nor mentioned suicide; and a
screening performed a few months before he committed suicide revealed no threat of such).
67. See id.
68. See id
69. See id
70. Other examples of employing no duty in place of no breach of duty as a matter of law can be
found in Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 64, at 712-16 and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 reporters' note cmt. i (2010).
71. 603 N.W.2d 713 (S.D. 1999).
72. Goldberg and Zipursky did this in the context of critiquing duty provisions adopted in the
Third Restatement of Torts, which employs a default duty of reasonable care when someone creates
a risk of harm to others. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 64, at 679.
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family. Shortly after it was completed, serious settling problems
developed. Selling the house to Parmely, Hildebrand disclosed the
difficulties he had had.7 1 When additional problems developed-windows
that wouldn't close, floors and walls cracking, and roof leaking-Parmely
sued, alleging, inter alia, negligent construction of the house. The court
concluded ("somewhat surprisingly," in Goldberg and Zipursky's view)"
that a non-professional builder owes no duty to purchasers of the home.
But suppose that due to negligent construction of the house by
Hildebrand, the roof collapsed, injuring Parmely. This change in the facts
reveals immediately that Parmely is not a core physical harm case. Rather,
it is one that involves economic loss and economic loss in the context of a
contract between the parties. That is a classic area in which courts leave the
rights and obligations of the parties to contract law and withdraw the
availability of tort claims in order to respect the boundary between tort and
contract. That is a sufficient, more revealing, and more limited
explanation for the outcome in Parmely-one that leaves room for liability
in the hypothetical above.so
IV. EMPLOYING UNFORESEEABILITY TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS No
DUTY BASED ON CASE-SPECIFIC FACTS OF THE SORT THAT WOULD
ORDINARILY BE FOR THE JURY OR OTHERWISE EMPLOYING
UNFORESEEABILITY IN AN INCOHERENT FASHION"
Courts have long been addicted to using unforeseeability both to deny
the existence of a duty in fact-specific terms and to establish a duty where it
had not previously existed. Foreseeability is an exceedingly attractive
platform for the former moves because it is highly manipulable.82
73. Parmely, 603 N.W. 2d at 714.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 714-15.
76. Id. at 715.
77. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 64, at 679.
78. Parmely, 603 N.W. 2d at 717-18.
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt.
d (2010).
80. Courts often use no duty in explaining why there is no liability for causing economic loss.
That usage is similar to Strauss's usage in that it does not address the idea of obligation and primary
behavior. Hildebrand's legal obligations of care in building the house surely cannot depend on the
ex post consequences-economic loss or personal injury-of shoddy construction methods.
81. The seminal contemporary work on foreseeability, critiquing its use for duty determinations,
is W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in the
Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REv. 739 (2005).
82. Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law:
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Foreseeability can be helpful (but misleading) for the latter effort because
the reasons for no duty often have nothing to do with the existence of
foreseeability. Thus, the basis for the no-duty-to-rescue rule has nothing to
do with the foreseeability vel non of harm, but the California Supreme
Court has utilized foreseeability to adopt an exception to that rule and to the
rule barring liability for economic loss. 8 4
In a two-for-one opportunity, illustrating both the collapsing of breach
and duty and a head-scratching use of foreseeability, consider Posecai v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,8 a case confronting the duty of a retail business to
provide security for its customers in the parking lot of the store. The court
said that whether a duty exists depends on the foreseeability of a criminal
act. 86 The court then adopted a "balancing test" for determining whether
this foreseeability existed.8 ' The test entailed comparing the foreseeability
of harm with the burden of a duty to protect.88
Note, first, the incoherence of a test of foreseeability, in which
foreseeability is but one of two elements to be considered. Note, second, the
role of the burden of precaution in determining foreseeability: what does the
expense of hiring a security guard or two have to do with foreseeing
anything? Note, third, that this determination of duty is a ticket good for
only one ride on the Posecai line, depending as it does on past instances of
crime at the business and in the vicinity, and thus relying on facts specific to
the case. 89  Note, fourth, that the court's determination of duty based on
balancing the foreseeability of harm with the burden of precaution is
essentially the same inquiry the jury would decide for breach purposes.
Finally, note that foreseeability is context specific-requiring consideration
of the specific facts in the case.90 Those are for the jury and, since breach
Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1039, 1046 (2001) (foreseeability is "so
open-ended [it] can be used to explain any decision, even decisions directly opposed to each
other... . [T]herefore, [it] undermine[s] clarity and certainty in the law whenever [it is] embedded
in a legal standard."). Ben Zipursky also puts it well, observing that foreseeability with "its
accordion-like meaning, is clearly one of the murky concepts that has led students and scholars to
think that negligence law lacks conceptual integrity." Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in
Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1247, 1249 (2009).
83. See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 671, 729-30
(2008).
84. See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958); Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
85. 752 So. 2d 762 (La. 1999).
86. Id at 768.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. For the arguments against duty being narrowed to decide only the case at hand, see Gergen,
supra note 33, at 438-39.
90. 1 issue this challenge to my students when we confront the use of foreseeability for duty
purposes: "Identify a category of cases in which we might inquire about whether a duty should exist.
If I cannot give you two sets of facts-with polar opposite likelihoods of harm-I will buy you a
free lunch." I have not yet had to pay off on this challenge.
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requires consideration of the foreseeable risk of harm, the breach inquiry is
the place for consideration of foreseeability.9 1
Reading cases like Posecai might result in a severe case of pruritus for
those uninitiated in the process of jury control. 92 How can a court decide if
a duty exists by using the same standards that the jury would use to decide if
there was breach of that duty?
Ben Zipursky has taken issue with the proposition that foreseeability has
no role in duty and that the only proper usage of foreseeability is context
specific.93 He argues that foreseeability might properly be used on a
categorical basis, as the court in Posecai promised it would, but did not.9 4
Thus, a court might consider the foreseeability of harm by social hosts,
psychotherapists, or land possessors with regard to trespassers on their land
in deciding whether to impose a duty. The degree of categorical
foreseeability might inform a court's decision about whether to extend or
withdraw a duty.
Professor Zipursky's position is theoretically appropriate and
reasonable. Categorical foreseeability could be used by courts for duty
purposes. Indeed, at one point in time, I agreed with Zipursky, but with
reflection I am dubious. 95 For a court to use this concept of categorical
91. See Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228 (Ariz. 2007); Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829
(Iowa 2009); A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. School Dist., 784 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2010); Behrendt v. Gulf
Underwriters Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 2009).
92. A case similar to Posecai, but one in which the court employed foreseeability to decide a
duty existed, is Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District, 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997). Plaintiff
alleged she was sexually abused by one Gadams, who was hired only after positive, but misleading,
references were provided by former employers-defendants. Id. at 585-86. In addressing whether a
duty of care existed in providing references, the Court employed foreseeability, a factor that is the
primary one for California duty determinations, but carefully observed that its foreseeability inquiry
was:
[N]ot to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light
of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the
category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm
experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.
Id. at 588-89. The court then proceeded to address the facts alleged in the complaint to inquire
whether defendants could "reasonably have foreseen that the representations and omissions in their
reference letters would result in physical injury to someone?," and concluded, "[a]lthough ...
Gadams's alleged assault on plaintiff is somewhat attenuated, we think the assault was reasonably
foreseeable." Id. at 589.
93. See Zipursky, supra note 82, at 1263.
94. Id.
95. In early drafts, the Third Restatement of Torts, of which I was a co-Reporter, recognized the
use of categorical foreseeability for duty purposes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 7 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No.2, 2002). Only in 2005, after
Jonathan Cardi exposed the misuse of foreseeability for duty purposes, did I rethink that proposition
and its desirability. See Cardi, supra note 81.
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foreseeability, it would require knowledge or evidence about the distribution
of individual likelihoods across the entire universe of incidents comprising
the category. I do not know who knows or even where to ascertain
information about the foreseeable risks across all, say, incidents of social
hosts' serving alcohol to others. Professor Zipursky invokes suits against
gun manufacturers regarding their distribution practices, stating, "[t]hus,
when courts decline to recognize a duty of care from manufacturers of guns
to victims of gun violence on 'no duty' grounds, part of their concern is the
limited capacity of gun manufacturers, as a categorical matter, to anticipate
(or foresee) how their products will be used."96  Perhaps, but does anyone
know what gun manufacturers know about their distributors' practices that
create risks of criminal use of handguns? About their shadier distributor
practices? At least some of the gun suits involved instances of deplorable
and irresponsible distributor conduct (revealed by police sting operations)
and allegations of manufacturer knowledge of such.97 How shall we put all
of this information together to form a categorical foreseeability judgment?98
Not only is the idea of categorical foreseeability non-implementable,
cases like Posecai reveal an additional concern. There the court agreed that
it should conduct its foreseeability analysis on a categorical level and then
proceeded to do just the opposite. 99  Leaving foreseeability in duty
determinations thus results in Posecai producing law in Louisiana that a
commercial establishment is only liable for inadequate security when both
the court and the jury concur that the defendant acted unreasonably.'00 But a
96. Zipursky, supra note 82, at 1263. Contrary to Professor Zipursky's claims, in Hamilton v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001), the most prominent case denying a duty of gun
manufacturers with regard to their distribution practices, the court rejected the role of foreseeability
for duty purposes in response to plaintiffs' arguments that foreseeability supported a finding of duty.
Id. at 1066. The court also suggested that its no-duty holding might change if a particular group of
corrupt distributors could be found, suggesting little patience for categorical foreseeability in the
duty calculus. Id. at 1064 n.5.
97. See City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003). The
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms conducts gun traces for law enforcement organizations
and has amassed considerable data about guns that have been of interest in investigations that might
provide information about problematical gun distribution patterns. See NAACP v. Acusport Corp.,
210 F.R.D. 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
98. I am not even sure what the category is when we think about psychotherapists and the
foreseeable risks to third parties: do we mean all psychotherapist/patient interactions? Only those
with patients that might plausibly pose a risk to others? Only those who make implicit or explicit
threats to harm others? Or some other category? Does anyone think they have any idea what the
categorical foreseeability is for any of those groups? Research in this area has focused on
assessments of dangerousness for criminal law purposes and reveals that there is a very low rate of
actual dangerousness, albeit among in-patients being evaluated. That low rate explains much of the
inaccuracy in predictions, even though those predictions are about dangerousness in general over a
long period of time. See JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
(1981); Joseph M. Livermore, Carl P. Malmquist & Paul E. Meehl, On the Justifications For Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 84 (1968).
99. See Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762 (La. 1999).
100. As Leon Green remarked about this matter over eighty years ago: "[I]t would be stranger still
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judge from a country in which there is no civil jury might be left wondering
(and head-scratching), after considering cases such as Posecai, "Why would
I want to decide the same inquiry twice in one case?"
V. DESCRIBING THE DUTY DETERMINATION IN FACT-SPECIFIC TERMS
BEFORE CONCLUDING No DUTY EXISTS OR THAT A MORE STRINGENT DUTY
THAN REASONABLE CARE APPLIES 0 1
Bill Powers provides a nice example of the narrowing of duty: a front-
end loader was designed with a roll over protective structure (ROPS) that
could be removed. 102 The owner, using it on ships with limited clearance,
removed the ROPS.10 3 Plaintiff, who operated the loader, was using it in a
warehouse where the ROPS would not have diminished the machine's
function, but the employer had not reinstalled it.10 Plaintiff was in an
if the law should provide the judge with the same formula for use in determining the existence of
duty as it gives to the jury for the determination of the violation of duty." Leon Green, The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases (Part 1), 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1029 (1928).
Posecai is not a one-off case in this "stranger still" world of the same standard being
employed for duty and breach of that duty. See Hoffman v. Union Elec. Co., 176 S.W.3d 706, 708
(Mo. 2005) (en banc) (holding that the existence of a duty depends on a judgment of "sound public
policy;" specifically: "In considering whether a duty exists in a particular case, a court must weigh
the foreseeability of the injury, the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding
against it and the consequences of placing that burden on defendant"); Castaneda v. Olsher, 162 P.3d
610 (Cal. 2007); In re Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 4571196, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2007)
("Learned Hand's so-called 'risk-benefit method' has taken hold among jurists who subscribe to a
'law and economics' approach to tort law. And while not specifically adopted in Delaware, our
courts have recognized that it is appropriate when engaged in the duty analysis for the court to
measure the risk to the plaintiff caused by the defendant's conduct, and the cost or burden to the
defendant in minimizing the risk."); Levy v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 798 So. 2d 778, 780 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001) (A legal "[d]uty is an allocation of risk determined by balancing the foreseeability of
harm, in light of all the circumstances, against the burden to be imposed."); McCall v. Wilder, 913
S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1995) ("A risk is unreasonable and gives rise to a duty to act with due care if the
foreseeable probability and gravity of harm posed by defendant's conduct outweigh the burden upon
defendant to engage in alternative conduct that would have prevented the harm." (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1964)).
101. Thus, in Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ohio 1989), the court narrowed the duty
determination to the detriment of the defendant. Plaintiff sued his wife's paramour after plaintiff
contracted a sexually transmitted disease. Id. at 270. Addressing the issue of defendant's duty, the
court wrote, "[A] person who knows, or should know, that he or she is infected with a venereal
disease has the duty to abstain from sexual conduct or, at the minimum, to warn those persons with
whom he or she expects to have sexual relations of his or her condition." Id.
102. See William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1699,
1705 (1997) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Tex. 1995)). Powers also
explains other cases in which the Texas Supreme Court relied on narrowed duties.
103. See id.
104. See id
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accident, and suffered an injury that the ROPS would have prevented.'0o
Plaintiff claimed that making the ROPS removable was a design defect, and
the jury found in his favor.' 06 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, relying
on the proposition that a manufacturer has no duty to design a multipurpose
machine in a way that would make it unavailable for any of its intended
uses. 07 That narrowing of the scope of duty prevented the fact finder from
considering whether the manufacturer had acted unreasonably in designing
and selling a machine that could be used without a ROPS (negligence) or
whether such a machine was defective (strict liability). Perhaps the Texas
Supreme Court truly meant that there was no circumstance-regardless of
the magnitude of the risk-in which a manufacturer should install a guard
that could eliminate that risk when doing so would render the product less
functional-regardless of the magnitude of lost functionality. I doubt it,
however, because risk-benefit analysis, like foreseeability, depends on the
facts of the case, not categorical statements.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are many answers to the question posed for this symposium, and
the array of subjects addressed by participants reveals the richness of the
inquiry and, indeed, tort law. The subject I chose, the impact of the jury, is
one that, in my judgment, pervades American tort law.
This impact is complicated, however, and contributes to inconsistent
outcomes and confusing doctrinal rhetoric. There is remarkable
ambivalence about the civil jury in American jurisprudence. But
"ambivalence" may not be the right word-unless we are speaking in an
aggregate way. Rather, "antipodal" is a more accurate characterization, with
diametrically opposing views about the jury. 08 It would be interesting to
compare judges who have ruled on multiple Daubert motions in the
frequency with which those motions are granted by each judge. My theory
is that the best predictor of how frequently they would rule that an expert's
testimony is inadmissible would be how they had ruled in the past on all
motions as a matter of law and that none of the case specific characteristics
would be more influential than those prior rulings. Those rulings, I suggest,
are influenced by the judge's attitude about the jury and its appropriate role
in civil cases.
To understand American tort law one must be acutely conscious of the
jury and the role that it plays not only for adjectival law but also for
105. See id.
106. See id
107. See id. (citing Caterpillar, 911 S.W.2d at 385).
108. See, e.g., Stapleton, Controlling the Future of the Common Law by Restatement, supra note
58, at 294 ("[T]his simply reflects a deeper schizophrenia in United States tort law toward the extent
of power that juries should wield."); Vidmar, supra note 19, at v.
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substantive law. The modem history of tort law is replete with the
development of doctrine and devices that regulate the respective roles of
judge and jury. The rest of the world, without a civil jury, has no need for
these developments, and since much of this work is done covertly, many
would have difficulty understanding what is taking place.
Duty doctrine in the United States is in an unenviable state, and much of
the problem can be attributed to it being a convenient device for courts to
assert hegemony over juries. Deciding that no duty exists in a case is a
comfortable exercise of legal authority by a judge because it does not require
wrestling with whether there is a real dispute that requires a jury to resolve
it. Recent decisions in a handful of courts,1 09 relying on guidance from the
Third Restatement of Torts, are heartening, but they leave a long way to go
before the United States can untangle its duty knots. There is little to
recommend the rest of the world take on the confusion and meanderings that
are suffused in American tort law.
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109. See supra note 91. But see Riedel v. ICI Ams. Inc., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009); Satterfield v.
Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008).
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